Prosecutorial Use of Expert Testimony in Domestic Violence Cases: From Recantation to Refusal to Testify by Rogers, Audrey
Pace University
DigitalCommons@Pace
Pace Law Faculty Publications School of Law
1-1-1998
Prosecutorial Use of Expert Testimony in Domestic
Violence Cases: From Recantation to Refusal to
Testify
Audrey Rogers
Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University, arogers@law.pace.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Family Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Audrey Rogers, Prosecutorial Use of Expert Testimony in Domestic Violence Cases: From Recantation to Refusal to Testify, 8 Colum.
J. Gender & L. 67 (1998), http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty/319/.
PROSECUTORIAL USE OF EXPERT 
TESTIMONY IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
CASES: FROM RECANTATION TO REFUSAL 
TO TESTIFY 
The Warren Moon case in 1996 generated considerable media and 
legal commentary on the issue of compelling a witness to testify against her 
spouse. Moon, a professional football player, was prosecuted for battering 
his wife even though she had refused to press charges. Pursuant to a 1995 
Texas law that abolished spousal immunity, the prosecution called Moon's 
wife, over her objection, to testify. In her testimony, she recanted her earlier 
statements that her husband had beaten her. Moon's subsequent acquittal led 
to enormous publicity on the issue of whether his wife should have been 
compelled to testify.' 
The Moon prosecutor made no attempt to call an expert witness to 
explain Mrs. Moon's recantation of her earlier statement that Moon "beat the 
s**t out of me."' 
' Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. I wish to thank 
Professor Bennett L. Gershman for his insightful advice, and my research assistant Liane 
Wilson, for her help in preparing this article. I am also indebted to Professors Michelle 
Simon and Leslie Garfield for their support and encouragement. 
' See, e.g., Domestic Violence, Should Victims Be Forced to Testify Against Their 
m, 82 ABA Journal 26 (May 1996); Colleen O'Connor, The Moons: A Case of Svousal 
Irnmunitv on Trial, Buffalo News, Mar. 18, 1996. at A7. The issue of the spousal immunity 
doctrine, which prevents spouses from being forced to testify against each other, is beyond this 
article's scope; for discussion of the doctrine, see Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated 
Victim Particivation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1849 (1996); 
Malinda L. Seymore, Isn't It a Crime: Feminist Perspectives on Svousal Immunitv and Svousal 
Violence, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1032 (1996); Debbie S. Holmes, Marital Privileges in the Criminal 
Context: The Need for a Victim S ~ o u s e  Exce~tion in Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 504.28 
Hous. L. Rev. 1095 (1991). 
The prosecution had presented considerable independent evidence to support the 
charges against Moon. Given this evidence, at least one commentator has questioned whether 
it was even necessary for the prosecutor to call Mrs. Moon. See Hanna, supra note 1, at 1906- 
07. 
Heinonline - -  8 Colum. J. Gender & L. 67 1998-1999 
68 Columbia Journal of Gender and Law [Vol 8:l 
Mandatory arrest laws and no-drop policies have greatly increased the number 
of batterers being pro~ecuted.~ Unlike conventional cases, however, where 
prosecutors rely on the cooperation and participation of complaining witnesses 
to obtain convictions, in domestic violence cases prosecutors are often faced 
with exceptional challenges. Such challenges include victims who refuse to 
testify, who recant previous statements, or whose credibility is attacked by 
defense questions on why they remained in a battering relationship. To 
explain the behavior of such victims, prosecutors rely increasingly on expert 
testimony on battering and its  effect^.^ While the use of expert testimony on 
battering and its effects has been widely used by women claiming that they 
have killed their abusers in self-defense,' it is only in the last few years that 
prosecutors have made significant efforts to use experts when prosecuting 
batterers6 
Until 1990, appellate courts in only a handful of jurisdictions had 
considered whether prosecutors may use expert testimony on battering and its 
See notes 23-24 and accompanying text infra. See generally Hanna, supra note 1, 
at 1863. 
I prefer the phrase "battering and its effects" rather than "battered woman's 
syndrome." See Janet Panish, Trend Analysis: Expert Testimony on Battering and its Effects 
in Criminal Cases, 11 Wis. Women's L.J. 75, 82 (1996). The latter term has been the subject 
of criticism by a number of scholars as evocative of stereotypes of women who have been 
abused as maladjusted or disturbed. See note 1 1 infra; see generally Alma Bowman, A Matter 
of Justice: Overcoming Juror Bias in Prosecutions of Batterers Through Expert Witness 
Testimony of the Common Experiences of Battered Women, 2 S. Cal. Rev. L. &Women's Stud. 
219,226 n.31 (1992). Other commentators criticize the phrase "battered woman's syndrome" 
as inadequate to encompass the broad range of reactions to battering. See Malcolm Gordon, 
Validity of "Battered Woman Syndrome" in Criminal Cases Involving Battered Women (visited 
March 7,1997) <http:Nwww.ojp.usdoj .gov/OCPAl94GuidesTT.  The great majority 
of the cases and commentators, however, use the terminology "battered woman's syndrome"; 
therefore, this article uses both phrases. 
See generally Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and 
Misconceptions in Current Reform Legislation, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 379 (1991); David L. 
Faigman &Amy J. Wright, The Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age of Science, 39 Ariz. L. 
Rev. 67 (1997). 
See generally Parrish, supra note 4; Myrna S. Raeder, Proving the Case: Battered 
Woman and Batterer Syndrome: The Double-Edged Sword: Admissibility of Battered Woman 
Syndrome By and Against Batterers in Cases Implicating Domestic Violence, 67 U. Colo. L. 
Rev. 789 (1996); Joan M. Schroeder, Using Battered Woman Svndrome Evidence in the 
Prosecution of a Batterer, 76 Iowa L. Rev. 553 (1991). 
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effects in a domestic violence prosecution.' Between 1991 and 1997, 
however, appellate courts in at least thirteen more jurisdictions ruled on the 
admissibility of expert testimony to explain a battering victim's puzzling 
behavior at or before trial.' All of those jurisdictions, except Ohio, approved 
of prosecutorial use of expert te~timony.~ 
Prosecutors have called experts to educate the jury on a victim's 
unusual behavior such as delay in reporting the violence, or why she would 
remain in the abusive relationship. Judicial acceptance of a prosecutor's use 
of expert testimony in the above settings raises the question of whether a 
prosecutor may use an expert to explain the victim's outright refusal to 
testify.'' To date, only one reported case has addressed this issue;" however, 
'See  Brandon v. State, 839 P.2d 400 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992) (dicta only); Pruitt v. 
State, 296 S.E.2d 795 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Baker, 424 A.2d 171 (N.H. 1980); State v. 
Frost, 577 A.2d 1282 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990); State v. Ciskie, 751 P.2d 1165 (Wash. 
-
1988). The precedential value of some of the earliest cases is doubtful. For a discussion of 
m, see note 82 and accompanying text infra. W s  relevancy is also doubtful because 
there the prosecution offered the testimony to explain the defendant's behavior, not the victim's 
conduct. 
' s ee  Arcoren v. United States, 929 F.2d 1235 (8th Cir. 1991); People v. Humphrey, 
921 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1996); People v. Morgan, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 772 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997); State v. 
Borelli, 629 A.2d 1105 (Conn. 1993); State v. Clark, 926 P.2d 194 (Haw. 1996), approving 
State v. Cababag, 850 P.2d 716 (Haw. Ct. App. 1993); Isaacs v. State, 659 N.E.2d 1036 (Ind. 
1995); Carnahan v. State, 681 N.E.2d 1164 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997); State v. Griffin, 564 N.W.2d 
370 (Iowa 1997); Commonwealth v. Goetzendanner, 679 N.E.2d 240 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997); 
People v. Christel, 537 N.W.2d 194 (Mich. 1995); State v. Searles, 680 A.2d 612 (N.H. 1996); 
People v. Hrvckewicz, 634 N.Y.S.2d 297 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); State v. Pargeon, 582 N.E.2d 
665 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (ruling that expert testimony is only admissible for self-defense 
purposes); State v. Bednarz, 507 N.W.2d 168 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993); Barnes v. State, 858 P.2d 
522 (Wyo. 1993). 
Lower courts in some jurisdictions have also allowed expert testimony in the 
prosecution of batterers. See, e.g., Peoole v. Ellis, 650 N.Y.S.2d 503 (N.Y.Sup. Ct. 1996). 
9 ~ e e  id. But see State v. Pargeon, 582 N.E.2d at 667. 
'O1deally, a complainant will cooperate with prosecutors and participate in a batterer's 
trial. Accordingly, a number of jurisdictions have devised special domestic violence units 
within the prosecutor's office to encourage voluntary participation. See Kathleen Waits, J& 
Criminal Justice Svstem's Response to Battering: Understanding The Problem, Forging The 
Solutions, 60 Wash. L. Rev. 267 (1985); Elena Saltzrnan, The Ouincv District Court Domestic 
Violence Prevention Promam: A Model Legal Framework for Domestic Violence Intervention, 
74 B.U. L. Rev. 329 (1994). Additionally, some jurisdictions have policies to compel a 
reluctant complainant to appear through subpoena and risk of contempt charges and possible 
incarceration. See, e.g., Hanna, supra note 1, at 1865-66; Waits, supra at 323. Much 
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the explosive growth in the number of batterers being prosecuted mandates 
that courts and commentators explore whether expert testimony is appropriate 
to explain the complainant's absence. The issue of prosecutorial use of expert 
testimony has received limited scholarly attention. Commentators who have 
addressed the question "tend to be fairly cautious" in their approach.12 Most 
would allow generalized information about abuse, but only following a 
defense attack on credibility.I3 However, the authors of one article have 
suggested that any prosecutorial use of expert testimony on battering and its 
effects is too prejudicial.'4 
This article discusses the use of expert testimony in prosecuting those 
charged with domestic abuse. Part I provides a background on the need and 
nature of expert testimony in domestic violence cases and the requirements for 
the admission of such expert testimony. It traces the development of the role 
of expert testimony in domestic violence cases from its initial exclusive use 
as a defense tool to support self-defense claims to its present use by 
prosecutors to explain a complainant's recantation or other puzzling behavior. 
Part 11 discusses the appellate cases that have addressed the admissibility and 
scope of expert testimony offered by the prosecution in domestic abuse cases. 
It then analyzes the proper uses of the expert testimony, including when the 
State may introduce the testimony and what guidelines courts should follow 
to ensure that its probative value outweighs any prejudicial effect on the 
defendant. 
Part III applies the existing case law to the uncharted issue of whether 
the courts should allow expert testimony to explain a complainant's outright 
controversy surrounds the issue of compelled appearance, which is beyond the scope of this 
article. Instead, this article operates from the assumption that regardless of the means 
prosecutors have employed to gain the complainant's presence, she is absent from trial. 
I '  See Pruitt v. State, 296 S.E.2d 795 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982); see note 82 and 
accompanying text infia. 
l2  See Raeder, supra note 6, at 801; see generally Schroeder, supra note 6; Faigman 
& Wright, supra note 5; Bowman, supra note 4; Hanna, supra note 1. 
l3 See Raeder, supra note 6, at 801; Schroeder, supra note 6; Bowman, supra note 
4. 
I4see Faigman & Wright, supra note 5, at 96-98. Faigman and Wright argue that no 
research exists to support the conclusion that a manifestation of battering is an increased chance 
of recantation. Anecdotal evidence does, however, support this claim. See Raeder, supra note 
6, at 807; Mary Ann Dutton, understanding Women's Resoonses to Domestic Violence: A 
Redefinition of Battered Woman's Syndrome, 21 Hofstra L. Rev. 1191, 1202 (1993). 
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refusal to testify. It explains that law enforcement needs to change the 
prototype of a domestic abuse prosecution from being victim-propelled to one 
where sufficient independent evidence of the crime is gathered to enable 
prosecutors to proceed without the victim's cooperation or participation. 
Concomitant with this shift in focus, prosecutors, such as those in the Moon 
case, should view expert testimony as an integral component of a victimless 
prosecution. Part III explains that courts should allow expert testimony to 
explain the characteristics of battered women to help the jury properly assess 
the state's evidence in light of the complainant's absence. By limiting the 
expert to explaining general aspects of battering and its effects, rather than 
addressing the particular victim or specific acts of violence, the courts will 
safeguard the defendant against undue prejudice. 
Over time, the propriety of defense use of expert testimony has been 
unanimously accepted by the courts. The same judicial acceptance is 
developing for prosecutorial use of expert testimony on battering. The 
relevance of the expert testimony is identical in both situations: It aids the 
jury in assessing the evidence by explaining the effect of battering on the 
witness. This article concludes that the developing trend of prosecutorial use 
of expert testimony is an appropriate and necessary tool in successfully 
prosecuting domestic violence cases. 
PART I-BACKGROUND ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT 
TESTIMONY ON THE EFFECTS OF BATTERING 
A. Psychological Effects of Battering and Its Impact on Prosecutions 
A brief description of the psychological manifestations of battering 
and its effects is necessary to highlight the importance of expert testimony as 
a prosecution tool. Dr. Lenore Walker, widely recognized as the first person 
to identify the battered woman's syndrome, describes it as "the cluster of 
psychological sequela from living in a violent relationship" that women 
develop.'' As promulgated by Dr. Walker, the syndrome is caused by a three- 
phase cycle of violence-tension building, confrontation, and contrition.16 
The cycle of violence may leave its victims with feelings of learned 
l5 Lenore E. Walker, The Battered Woman Syndrome, xi, 1 (1984). 
l6 See id. at 95; Lenore E. Walker, Battered Woman 55-70 (1979). 
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helplessness," low self-esteem, depression, minimization techniques," self- 
isolation, and passivity. 
These psychological reactions may manifest themselves in behavior 
that might appear baffling and even frustrating to the average person. The 
refusal to leave the relationship, the unwillingness to pursue legal action 
against the batterer, or the inability to protect one's children from abuse may 
each stem from the psychological effects of being battered. Many women also 
stay with their batterers because of legitimate fears of retaliation and lack of 
viable  alternative^.'^ 
A state's attempt to prosecute a batterer may be undermined by the 
victim's delay in seeking police intervention, her refusal to cooperate with 
prosecutors, her recantation of statements implicating the battered for her 
injuries, or her remaining in the abusive re la t i~nship.~~ Many prosecutors 
I' "Learned helplessness" is the cornerstone of the syndrome. It is derived from 
animal studies in which dogs were subjected to electric shocks and later were unable to take 
advantage of readily available escape opportunities. Walker, Battered Woman, supra note 16, 
at 47-49. According to Dr. Walker, the victim, after repeated beatings, begins to believe that 
she has no control over the violence, and she loses the ability to escape, even when viable means 
to escape exist. Id. Learned helplessness may help to explain why a battered woman remains 
with the batterer. See Waits, supra note 10, at 282-83; Dutton, supra note 14, at 1197 & n.33. 
Walker's theory has not been free from criticism. See Raeder, supra note 6, at 796. 
Some commentators prefer to remove the stigma of the label, prefemng to refer to the woman's 
reaction as one of survival. See Raeder, supra note 6, at 796 n.3 1. Others have questioned the 
validity of Walker's findings on a number of grounds. Commentators have criticized the nature 
of the sample, the lack of a control group, the methodology of the interviews, and the lack of 
support in the data for the conclusions Walker drew. See Robert F. Schoop et al . ,  Battered 
Woman Syndrome, E x ~ e r t  Testimony, and the Distinction between Justification and Excuse, 
1994 U. Ill. L. Rev. 45, 54-56 (1994). Notwithstanding such criticism, Walker's theory has 
been vitally instrumental in changing judicial and public perceptions about domestic violence. 
At least one commentator has noted that "there is massive anecdotal evidence generally 
confirming the syndrome." Raeder, supra note 6, at 797. 
Is Typically, a battering victim minimizes the severity of the attack and her injuries. 
Walker, Battered Woman, supra note 16, at 63; see also Waits, supra note 10, at 293. 
l9 see ~ a m e s  Martin Truss, The Subjection of Women. . . Still: Unfulfilled Promises 
of Protection for Women Victims of Domestic Violence, 26 St. Mary's L.J. 1149, 1172-73 
(1995); Diane Patton, "He Never Hit Me9'-The Need for Exvert Testimonv in Domestic 
Violence Cases, 30 Ariz. Att'y 10 (Jan. 1994). 
20 See generally Chief Judge A.M. "Sandy" Keith, Domestic Violence and the Court 
Svstem, Remarks at the Jurist-in Residence Program at Hamline University School of Law (Apr. 
11, 1991), in 15 Hamline L. Rev. 105 (1991). 
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have commented about a victim's lack of c~operation.~' Indeed, historically, 
law enforcement officials have used the lack of victim cooperation as an 
excuse for their lax response to domestic violence.22 The official response to 
domestic violence cases has been dramatically altered by mandatory arrest 
laws that limit law enforcement's discretion in making arrestsz3 and no-drop 
policies that mandate prosecution of domestic violence cases regardless of the 
victim's c~operation.'~ However, the same misapprehension that previously 
had colored law enforcement's ability to respond to a victim's plight most 
likely exists in the minds of the jurors assessing charges brought against an 
alleged batterer. Expert testimony on battering and its effects is necessary to 
educate the jurors. The admissibility and scope of the expert testimony is 
discussed in the following sub-section. 
2' See Waits, supra note 10, at 3 1 1 - 12. 
See Waits, supra note 10, at 3 11-12. 
23 Mandatory arrest policies evolved as a response to decades, perhaps centuries, of 
non-intervention by law enforcement toward domestic disputes. See generally, Waits, supra 
note 10, at 310-16 (detailing the historically inadequate police response to domestic violence). 
In the 1960s, mediation of domestic violence disputes became the police norm. See generally 
Developments in the Law-Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 Haw. L. Rev. 1498 
(1993). Mediation proved to be ineffective in addressing domestic violence because the police 
viewed both the abuser and the victim as similarly situated, and treated the incident as a family 
dispute rather than a criminal offense. See generally Marion Wanless, Mandatorv Arrest: A 
Ster, Toward Eradicating Domestic Violence. But Is It Enough?, 1996 Ll. Ill. L. Rev. 533. By 
the mid-1980s. following the urging of domestic violence advocacy groups and the imposition 
of large civil damage awards against police departments for failing to intervene, see Thunan 
v. Citv of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984), the United States Attorney General 
recommended arrest as the appropriate response to domestic incidents. See Hanna, supra note 
1, at 1859. Since then, every state has adopted some form of mandatory arrest rules. Typically, 
such rules require an arrest when the officer has probable cause to believe a misdemeanor has 
been committed. See generally, Hanna, supra note 1, at 1859-60; Wanless, supra. 
24   he development of no-drop policies were a natural outgrowth of mandatory arrest 
laws. Parallel to the historical police reluctance to intervene in a domestic disputes, prosecutors 
also were mired in a hands-off approach. See Hanna, supra note 1, at 1859-60; Waits, supra 
note 10, at 299-302. As more arrests were made, attention was shifted to the prosecutor's role 
in stemming domestic violence. Many offices have adopted no-drop policies which range from 
checking a prosecutor's discretion to dismiss a domestic violence case, to providing guidelines 
on prosecuting such cases with or without the victim's cooperation. See generally Angela 
Corsilles, No-Dror, Policies in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases: Guarantee to 
Action or- Dangerous Solution?, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 853 (1994); Hanna, supra note 1 
(describing the various types of no-drop policies). 
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B. General Admissibility Requirements of Expert Testimony 
Domestic violence crimes are predominantly governed by state law.2s 
However, since all  jurisdictions have  requirements fo r  t he  admissibility of 
expert testimony identical with or similar to the  Federal Rules o f  Evidence, 
this  Art icle  uses the  Federal Rules as a prototype. T h e  first consideration for 
the  admission of any evidence i s  whether  it  is r e l e ~ a n t . ' ~  Additionally, 
Federal Rule o f  Evidence 702 sets forth the  basic rule  o f  admissibility of 
expert testimony: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form 
of an opinion or ~ therwise .~ '  
The generally accepted understanding o f  Ru le  702's requirements is 
that expert 's testimony should aid the jury's understanding o f  the  evidence but 
that the topic need not  be completely outside t he  general understanding of the  
25 But see Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. Q 10410 (1997) 
(federalizes acts of domestic violence under certain circumstances, such as traveling across state 
lines with the intent to inflict bodily harm). 
26 Fed. R. Evid. 401. The rule defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Id. Thus, 
evidence is relevant if it is material and probative to the issues in dispute. According to 
McCormick, materiality examines the relationship between the propositions for which the 
evidence is offered an the issues in the case. Probative value is the tendency for of the evidence 
to establish the proposition for which it is offered. See 1 McCormick on Evidence 5 185 (John 
W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992). 
"~ed .  R. Evid. 702. Rule 702's language has been adopted in whole or in substantial 
part by at least forty states. See Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Federal 
Evidence 5 702[06] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 1998). 
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that the testimony be based on scientifically valid meth~dology,~~ and 
that the expert be q~alified.~' Additionally, the trial court must decide 
whether the evidence's probative value outweighs any prejudicial impact.31 
C. Defense Use of Expert Testimony on Battering and Its Effects 
Defendants initiated the use of expert testimony on battering and its 
effects. The typical case involved a woman who was charged with killing her 
abusive mate and who raised a claim of self-defense. Courts have ruled that 
because a battered woman's behavior and perceptions are beyond the ken of 
a typical juror's understanding, expert testimony is needed to assist the jury 
in determining whether the defendant acted in self-defense.32 
. Notwithstanding the courts' present acceptance of testimony on 
battered woman's syndrome, initial court reaction to a defense attempt to 
Rule 702 does not require that the subject of the expert testimony be completely 
outside the comprehension of the average juror. The federal rule is based on a "helpful" 
standard. See Weinstein & Berger, supra note 27, 8 702[02]. 
29 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Daubert 
rejected the seventy-year-old &test of admissibility of expert testimony. See Frve v. United 
States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Under m. expert testimony was admissible only if 
based on scientific technique that was "generally accepted as reliable in the scientific 
community. Id. at 1014. The Daubert Court removed the requirement of "general acceptance." 
According to the Daubert Court, the test for admissibility is whether there is a "valid scientific 
connection to the pertinent inquiry." 509 U.S. 579, 580. Courts and commentators have 
generally regarded Daubert as liberalizing the admissibility of expert testimony. See, e.g., 
United States v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 1994); Michael H. Gottesman, Should 
Federal Evidence Rules Trump State Tort Policy? The Federalism Values Daubert Ignored, 15 
Cardozo L. Rev. 1837 (1994). 
See Weinstein & Berger, supra note 27, 8 702[04]. 
3' Fed. R. Evid. 403 provides that "[allthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if 
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of 
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." See generally Weinstein & Berger, supra note 
27, 5 403. 
32 Typically, the expert will testify as to the battered woman's heightened perception 
of danger that may make her reasonably fearful of an imminent threat of great bodily harm in 
situations where an average juror may not perceive the threat. See, e.g., State v. Leidholm, 334 
N.W.2d 81 1 (N.D. 1983); State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984). 
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introduce expert testimony on the battered woman's syndrome was mixed.33 
Since defense attacks on a prosecutor's use of experts parallel the earlier 
efforts to introduce battered woman's syndrome testimony by the defense, a 
review of the history of the syndrome's role in criminal cases is helpful. 
One of the earliest attempts to use battered woman's syndrome as a 
defense arose in State v. ~ e l l y . ~ ~  There, a woman was indicted for murder 
after she killed her husband during an altercation. The defendant claimed that 
she acted in self-defense, although the State strongly disputed this 
~ontention.~' The trial court denied her attempt to introduce expert testimony 
on the battered woman's syndrome to explain her state of mind and to bolster 
her self-defense claim. The defendant was convicted of reckless 
manslaughter. 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed and remanded for a new 
trial based on the refusal to allow the expert testimony. Noting first that the 
initial question in deciding the admissibility of expert testimony is its 
relevance, the court reasoned that the defendant's credibility was the "critical 
issue" in the case. Therefore, the expert testimony was relevant in assessing 
the honesty of her belief that she was in imminent danger of death at the time 
she killed her spouse.36 The court stated that the expert could have explained 
to the jury why the defendant had remained with her spouse even though he 
had repeatedly abused her in the past. As the court noted, "Whether raised by 
the prosecutor as a factual issue or not, our own common knowledge tells us 
that most of us, including the ordinary juror, would ask himself or herself just 
such a question."37 
The Kellv court also explained that the expert testimony, in educating 
the jury about the battered woman's syndrome, would help the jury assess the 
" Compare State v. Thomas, 423 N.E.2d 137 (Ohio 1981) (inadmissible) with State 
v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984); Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1979) 
(admissible). Some courts found that the syndrome was not based on scientifically recognized 
data. See generally Laurie Kratky Dore, Downward Adiustment and the Slivvew Slove: The 
Use of Duress in Defense of Battered Offenders, 56 Ohio St. L.J. 665,684 n.77 (1995). Other 
courts ruled against its admissibility, reasoning that the expert invaded the jury's province on 
judging credibility issues. See Raeder, supra note 6, at 805. 
" 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984). 
3 5 ~  ee id. at 368. 
36 See id. at 375. 
37 Id. at 377. 
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reasonableness of the defendant's fear of imminent danger, a crucial element 
of her self-defense 
Following Kelly, courts in every jurisdiction have approved of the 
admissibility of expert testimony on battered woman's syndrome when raised 
to support a self-defense claim.39 The crucial factor in the admissibility of the 
expert testimony was the courts' findings that the battering relationship and 
its effects on the victim of abuse were outside the understanding of the 
average Following the original use of expert testimony to support a 
classic self-defense claim where the defendant has killed an abusive mate in 
the course of a confrontation, defendants have sought to admit expert 
testimony on battered woman's syndrome in a variety of less traditional cases. 
To date, courts have allowed the expert testimony in cases where a defendant 
claims self-defense for a non-confrontational killing-the "sleeping spouse" 
scenario:' where a defendant claims duress based on battered woman's 
syndrome as a defense to and where a woman is a respondent in a 
civil proceeding seeking to terminate her parental rights based on her failure 
to protect her children from an abusive mate.43 
As this section has demonstrated, the behavior manifested by many 
victims of domestic violence has generated the need for expert testimony to 
educate jurors on battering and its effects. The expert can explain that a 
victim of abuse may remain in an abusive relationship, recant charges against 
an abuser, or refuse to assist in the prosecution of a batterer because of a 
variety of reasons including psychological manifestations of abuse, fear of 
retaliation, or lack of viable housing and financial alternatives. Although the 
need for expert testimony was first recognized in cases where a battered 
38 On remand, both sides presented experts; the prosecution experts testified that Mrs. 
Kelly did not meet the criteria of a battered woman. She was convicted of murder. See 
Elizabeth Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem 
of Exuert Testimony on Battering, 9 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 195,211-12 (1986). 
39 See generally Panish, supra note 4. 
See, e.g.. Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Smith v. 
State, 277 S.E.2d 678 (Ga. 1981); State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793 (Minn. 1989). 
-
4' See, e.g., State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572 (Kan. 1988); State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W. 
2d 81 1 (N.D. 1983); cf. State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 3 12 (Wash. 1984) (spouse lying on couch with 
back turned to defendant when she killed him). 
"See, e.g., Peoule v. Romero, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 332 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992), vacated on 
other grounds, 883 P.2d 388 (Cal. 1994). 
43 See, e.g., In re Matter of Glenn G., 587 N.Y.S.2d 464 (N.Y. Farn. Ct. 1992). 
Heinonline - -  8 Colum. J. Gender & L. 77 1998-1999 
78 Columbia Journal of Gender and Law [Vol 8:l 
woman killed her attacker in self-defense, its use by prosecutors is predicated 
on identical goals-that the jury accurately assess the evidence before it. 
PART 11-PROSECUTORIAL USE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 
A. Development of the Case Law 
Pivotal in the early cases to evoke the battered woman's syndrome 
was the defense use of the expert testimony. In recent years, however, with 
the tremendous increase in the number of domestic violence arrests and 
prosecutions, the prosecution has sought to use expert testimony on battering 
and its effects. With its holding in State v. Ci~kie ,~"  the Supreme Court of 
Washington became the first state appellate court to affirm the prosecutorial 
use of battered woman's syndrome to explain a battering victim's behavior. 
In Ciskie, the defendant was charged with four counts of rape over a 
23-month period of a woman with whom he had an abusive relationship. The 
defense claimed that the sexual encounters were consensual, as evidenced by 
the victim's failure to report them, or to break off the relationship. To rebut 
this attack on the victim's credibility, the prosecution offered expert testimony 
on battered woman's syndrome as part of its case-in-chief. In upholding the 
admission of the testimony, the Washington Supreme Court relied heavily on 
its earlier decisions upholding the admission of expert testimony on battered 
woman's syndrome when offered by the defendant as part of a self-defense 
claim. The court reasoned that the key to the admissibility of expert testimony 
under Washington's evidence rule4' was whether it would be helpful to the 
trier of facts. The court noted that without the help of expert testimony, an 
average juror would not understand why the victim would stay in an abusive 
relationship. It further reasoned that the testimony was not unduly prejudicial 
to the defendant because the expert gave her opinion only to a hypothetical 
situation, and because the trial court correctly refused to allow the expert to 
opine as to whether the victim was in fact raped. 
Following Ciskie, courts have further ruled on appropriate 
prosecutorial use of expert testimony.46 The courts are most receptive to 
allowing expert testimony when the victim recants at trial earlier statements 
" 751 P.2d 1165 (Wash. 1988). 
45 Wash. R. Evid. 702. 
See note 8 supra. 
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implicating the defendant.47 For example, in State v. the Supreme 
Court of Montana generally endorsed prosecutorial use of expert testimony. 
There, the defendant was convicted of assault and aggravating kidnapping 
after he broke into a home in which his ex-wife was visiting, forced her to 
leave at gunpoint, and assaulted her.49 At trial, the defendant's ex-wife 
recanted her earlier statements to the police implicating the defendant. Over 
the defendant's objection that it was improper bolstering,50 the trial court 
allowed the State to call an expert on battered woman's syndrome to explain 
the syndrome and why a complaining witness may recant earlier statements 
against her abuser. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Montana ruled that prosecution may 
use expert testimony on battered woman's syndrome to explain 
47 See, e.g., Arcoren v. United States, 929 F.2d. 1235 (8th Cir. 1990); State v. Borelli, 
629 A.2d 1105 (Conn. 1993); State v. Cababaq, 850 P.2d 716 (Haw. Ct. App. 1993); State v. 
Bednarz, 507 N.W. 2d 168 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993). The courts in at least one jurisdiction have 
refused to allow expert testimony on battered woman's syndrome to be used for any purpose 
other than as part of a self-defense claim. See State v. Pargeon, 582 N.E.2d 665 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1991) (interpreting its evidence rule as limiting battered woman's syndrome to self-defense 
claims). 
48 897 P.2d 1063 (Mont. 1995). 
49 See id. at 1065. 
The term "bolstering" generally means an impermissible attempt to enhance the 
credibility of a witness. See Bennett Gershman, Trial Error and Misconduct 8 5-l(a), at 301 
(1997). Accordingly, courts customarily stress that since the jury has the exclusive role of 
assessing credibility, it is improper for a witness to comment on the credibility of other 
witnesses. See, e.g., United States v. Shay, 57 F.3d 126 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v. 
Richter, 826 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1987); State v. Lindsay, 720 P.2d 620 (Ariz. 1986); State v. 
Friedrich, 398 N.W.2d 763 (Wis. 1987). 
The scope of expert testimony is circumscribed by these limitations. The expert may 
not invade the jury's province by opining on a witness's truthfulness or whether he or she 
believes the witness. See, e.g., State v. Oliver, 372 S.E.2d 256 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988); State v. 
m, 617 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1993); State v. Raymond, 540 N.W. 2d 407 (S.D. 1995). 
Additionally, the expert may not give an opinion that the witness has been victimized by the 
defendant. See, e.g., State v. Griffin, 564 N.W.2d 370 (Iowa 1997); Commonwealth v. 
Goetzendanner, 679 N.E.2d 240 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997); State v. Ellis, 656 A.2d 25 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1995). 
Courts have held that it is not improper bolstering for an expert to explain behavior 
patterns of persons in the complainant's class so as to aid the jury in assessing the evidence 
before it. See Commonwealth v. Goetzendanner, 679 N.E.2d at 244; State v. Griffin, 564 
N.W.2d at 374-75. See generally Gershman, supra 5 5 4 ) .  at 334-36. 
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inconsistencies in a witness's testimony. The court stressed that this was not 
impermissible bolstering of the victim's testimony since the witness had 
recanted. Moreover, the court explained that the expert could testify only 
generally on battered woman's syndrome to explain why a battered woman 
might recant, not on whether the particular witness was t r~thful .~ '  
In addition to using experts to explain a recantation, the State 
commonly seeks to use expert testimony to rehabilitate a witness after the 
defense has attacked her credibility by pointing out behavior inconsistent with 
being abused, such as remaining with the attacker or failing to report the 
abuse.52 In a case of first impression for its jurisdiction, the Appeals Court of 
Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. Goetzendanners3 ruled that expert 
testimony on battering was appropriate to help explain a victim's conduct. 
The defendant in Goetzendanner was charged with kidnapping, raping, and 
assaulting a woman with whom he had had a four-month relationship. 
According to the complainant, their relationship was marked with violence 
that culminated in the charged acts. On cross-examination, defense counsel 
attacked the witness's credibility by pointing to her "vacillating behavior 
toward the defendant."54 The prosecution then called an expert witness to 
educate the jury about the dynamics of domestic violence. In upholding the 
admission of such testimony, the court noted that evidence of battered 
woman's syndrome was admissible to enlighten the jury about behavioral and 
emotional characteristics common to battering victims.5s It cautioned, 
however, that the expert could not offer an opinion as to whether the 
complainant was an abused woman.56 
5' The Stringer court approved of prosecutorial use of expert testimony on battering 
and its effects as a general concept. See 897 P.2d at 1068-69. It ruled, however, that the State 
failed to lay an appropriate foundation for its admissibility because there was no evidence that 
the ex-wife was a battered woman. See id. at 1069-70. 
52 See, e.g., State v. Griffin, 564 N.W.2d 370 (Iowa 1997); Commonwealth v. 
Goetzendanner, 679 N.E.2d 240 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997); State v. Ciskie, 751 P.2d 1165 (Wash. 
1988); Arcoren v. United States, 929 F.2d 1235 (8th Cir. 1991); In the Matter of Victoria C., 
630 N.Y.S.2d 470 (N.Y. Farn. Ct. 1995). 
53 679 N.E.2d 240 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997). 
" Id. at 243. 
55 See id. at 244. 
56 See id. at 245. 
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Consistent with the reasoning employed by the Goetzendanner court, 
the Supreme Court of Michigan in Peovle v. Christels7 ruled that the lower 
court erred in admitting expert testimony on battering and its effect because 
the victim did not exhibit any puzzling or inconsistent behavior." According 
to the court, the lack of incongruous behavior obviated the need for expert 
testimony to aid the jury in assessing the evidence before it. 
Some courts have allowed the prosecution to offer expert opinion 
evidence on battering and its effects without a recantation or a specific 
defense attack on credibility if the complainant exhibits anomalous behavior 
at trial." In State v. ~earles,~'  the defendant appealed his conviction on 
assault charges on the ground that the trial court improperly permitted expert 
testimony on the dynamics of domestic violence when he never attacked the 
witness's credibility. In rejecting the defendant's argument, the Supreme 
Court of New Hampshire ruled that the need for expert testimony was 
triggered by a victim's puzzling actions, regardless of any defense attack on 
her credibility. Relying on its earlier ruling in a child sexual abuse syndrome 
case, the court noted that "expert testimony may be offered to preempt 
negative inferences based upon the victim's a~tions."~' 
'' 537 N.W.2d 194 (Mich. 1995). 
Although the court ruled that the lower court erred in admitting the expert 
testimony, it ruled that the error was harmless because of the extensive independent evidence 
of sexual assault. See id. at 197. 
Whether the court ruled correctly that there was no need for the expert testimony is 
questionable. The crux of the defense was that the sexual acts were consensual. Accordingly, 
the defense vigorously attacked the complainant's credibility by pointing to her continued 
relationship with the defendant following the alleged attack. See id. at 198. Other courts have 
held that such seemingly anomalous behavior is sufficient to warrant the introduction of expert 
testimony. See, e.g., State v. Ciskie, 751 P.2d 1165 (Wash. 1988). 
59 See State v. Frost, 577 A.2d 1282 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990); State v. Searles, 
680 A.2d 612 (N.H. 1996); State v. Barnes, 858 P.2d 522 (Wyo. 1993). 
680 A.2d 612 (N.H. 1996). 
Id. at 614 (citing State v. Cressey, 628 A.2d 696 (N.H. 1993)). In addition, the 
court rejected the defendant's claim that the testimony was unduly prejudicial because it implied 
that he was the batterer. The court noted that the trial court limited the expert to testifying about 
general characteristics of domestic violence victims and not about the particular individuals. 
See id. 
Other courts have ruled that the prosecution may offer testimony that supports a 
witness's credibility regardless of any defense attack. In State v. Frost, 577 A.2d at 1287, the 
court allowed expert testimony on battered woman's syndrome as part of the State's case-in- 
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In some cases, the prosecution has sought to offer the expert testimony to 
prove the victim was, in fact, battered.62 Most courts have refused to allow 
this use of expert testimony, finding that its probative value is outweighed by 
chief in the trial of a batterer charged with sexual assault. The court relied on New Jersey Rule 
of Evidence 20, which specifies that "for the purpose of impairing or supporting the credibility 
of a witness, any party . . . may . . . introduce extrinsic evidence relevant upon the issue of 
credibility . . . ." 577 A.2d at 1287 (emphasis added). The Frost court further allowed the 
expert to opine that the complainant was in fact a battered woman. See id. at 1286-88. 
One commentator has suggested that Frost had limited applicability to other cases 
because of the unique evidentiary rule upon which its reasoning was based. See Schroeder, 
supra note 6, at 575-76. However, at least one court has adopted M s  reasoning even though 
the evidence statute in that court's jurisdiction paralleled the less inclusive language in Federal 
Rule of Evidence 607, which states that "the credibility of a witness may be attacked by any 
party including the party calling him." See Barnes v. State, 858 P.2d 522 (Wyo. 1993). The 
Barnes defendant was charged with the brutal murder of his girlfriend's five-year-old daughter. 
The defendant tried to implicate his girlfriend in the child's death. The State called a police 
officer to testify as to the mother's behavior, and the defendant objected on the grounds that it 
improperly bolstered her credibility. The defendant also objected to the admission of the 
mother's testimony as a victim's impact statement. The Wyoming Supreme Court analogized 
to cases where it permitted expert testimony to educate the jury on why a rape victim may delay 
in reporting the assault, and upheld the testimony in the case before it. The court reasoned that 
"[a] corollary to the rule allowing a party to attack the credibility of a witness is to permit the 
opposing party to bolster that credibility." 858 P.2d at 533. The court mled that a party need 
not wait for the opposing party to attack a witness's credibility before it can be bolstered, and 
it allowed the mother to testify as to the impact of her child's death. See id. at 534-35. 
The Barnes court appears to hold that a party may bolster the testimony of its 
witnesses, in contravention of the generally prevailing rule regarding such impermissible 
bolstering. See note 50 and accompanying text supra. However, the proper scope of Barnes's 
ruling may be explained by examining the facts of the case. 
Although the Barnes court spoke broadly about allowing a party to support its 
witness's credibility even if the opposing counsel has not attacked it, in fact, the defense 
"repeatedly and vigorously" attacked the mother's credibility on cross-examination. 858 P.2d 
at 534. Thus, Barnes is consistent with prevailing authority that allows expert testimony to 
rehabilitate a witness or to explain puzzling behavior. 
62 See State v. Ciskie, 751 P.2d 1 165 (Wash. 1988) (trial court specifically prohibited 
such testimony). 
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its prejudicial impact.63 Instead, the courts permit the expert to testify 
generally about battering and its effects.64 
B. Guidelines for Prosecutorial Use of Expert Testimony 
As the cases described above illustrate, the courts have been most 
receptive to the State's use of expert testimony when it is introduced to rebut 
a defense attack on the victim's credibility or to explain a re~antation.~' The 
courts have pointedly rejected defense efforts to limit expert testimony on 
battering and its effects to cases where a woman uses it to support a self- 
defense claim, acknowledging that it "would seem anomalous to allow a 
battered woman, where she is a criminal defendant, to offer this type of expert 
testimony in order to help the jury understand the actions she took, yet deny 
her that same opportunity when she is the complaining witness and/or victim 
and her abuser is the criminal defendant."66 
A synthesis of the courts' reasoning in the cases that have allowed 
expert testimony reveals that the key consideration is whether such testimony 
can help explain seemingly bizarre or puzzling behavior by a witness without 
undue prejudice to the defendant. With this principle as a guide, we can 
articulate certain guidelines for prosecutorial use of expert testimony on 
battering and its effects. 
First, since it is a witness's puzzling behavior that triggers the need for 
expert testimony to help the jury assess the evidence before it, its introduction 
should not be dependent on a defense attack on the witness's credibility. A 
number of courts have upheld trial court rulings that allowed the prosecution 
to call an expert witness without requiring any defense attack on the witness's 
~redibility.~' These courts have ruled correctly that expert testimony that 
6 3 ~ e e ,  e.g., State v. Borelli, 629 A.2d 1105, 1 1  15 (Conn. 1993); State v. Griffin, 564 
N.W.2d 370 (Iowa 1997); State v. Ciskie, 751 P.2d 1165 (Wash. 1988). 
@see, e.g., State v. Borelli, 629 A.2d at 1 1  15; State v. Griffin, 564 N.W.2d at 374-75; 
State v. Ciskie, 751 P.2d at 1166-74. 
65 See notes 47-53 and accompanying text supra. 
66 State v. Frost, 577 A.2d at 1287. 
67 See Barnes v. State, 858 P.2d 522 (Wyo. 1993); State v. Frost, 577 A.2d at 1287- 
88; State v. Searles, 680 A.2d at 615; People v. Christel, 537 N..W.2d 194 (Mich. 1995). See 
also notes 59-61 and accompanying text supra. 
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explains general characteristics to offset common misconceptions is 
permis~ible.~~ 
Concomitantly, the timing of the introduction of the expert testimony 
is not, by itself, critical. In many instances, it will be the defense that points 
to puzzling behavior, such as the failure to report an abuse incident, or the 
failure to leave the re la t i~nship.~~ The State will then seek to admit the expert 
as a rebuttal witness, or as part of its case-in-chief following the defendant's 
cross-examination of the complainant. In other instances, however, the 
defense may not attack the witness's testimony. The State still should be 
allowed to present expert testimony as part of its case-in-chief if it aids the 
jury in its understanding of the evidence. 
Some courts and commentators have insisted, however, that courts 
admit expert testimony only for rebuttal or rehabilitation after a defense attack 
and not as part of the State's case-in-~hief.~' They reason that to allow it in 
other circumstances would be improper bolstering." This position is 
unnecessarily narrow and its shortcomings are most apparent when applied to 
a complainant who recants earlier charges against the defendant. In such an 
instance, the defendant would not want to attack the complainant's testimony. 
This should not bar the prosecution from offering expert testimony to explain 
the incongruous behavior. The rules of evidence governing expert testimony 
are grounded in the usefulness of the expert te~tirnony,'~ not on an inquiry on 
the evidentiary vehicle used for its admission. A jury will necessarily be 
perplexed by a victim's recantation unless it is educated on battering and its 
effects. 
The genesis of the rebuttal or rehabilitation requirement appears to be 
court rulings on the use of expert testimony in the related areas of child sexual 
abuse cases and rape trauma syndrome cases. In many of these cases, the 
courts have limited the introduction of expert testimony to rebuttal or 
See generally Gershman, supra note 50. 
69 See note 52 and accompanying text supra. 
'O See P e o ~ l e  v. Christel, 537 N.W.2d at 205 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting) (expert 
testimony should be limited "to the narrow purpose" of rebuttal); Schroeder, supra note 6, at 
573. 
" See, e.g., Schroeder, supra note 6, at 573. 
72 See notes 26-28 and accompanying text supra. 
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rehabilitati~n.~~ Their reasoning is that unless the expert testimony is limited 
to rehabilitating the witness or rebutting a defense attack on the victim's 
credibility, the expert testimony would constitute improper b~ls te r ing .~~ 
Courts and commentators have pointed to the similarities between 
cases involving rape victims, child sexual abuse victims, and battered 
women.75 However, some crucial differences may exist. Typically, in a rape 
trauma case the defense attacks the victim's credibility by arguing that the 
intercourse was consensual. Defense counsel may point to a victim's failure 
to report the rape as a means of impeaching the victim's trial testimony that 
she was raped. Similarly, in a child sexual abuse case, the defense may 
highlight the child's delay in reporting an attack or earlier inconsistent 
statements to discredit the victim's testimony that the defendant abused him 
or her. In both cases, the victim testifies against the defendant at trial.76 The 
73  See, e.g., People v. Bowker, 249 Cal. Rptr. 886 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (expert 
testimony on child sexual abuse syndrome limited to rebuttal following defense attack); People 
v. Bledsoe, 681 P.2d 291 (Cal. 1984) (expert testimony permissible for limited purpose of 
rebutting a defense suggestion that the victim's behavior was inconsistent with being raped); 
Peovle v. Beckley, 456 N.W.2d 391 (Mich. 1990) (expert testimony on child sexual abuse 
syndrome admissible only for rebuttal or rehabilitation). See generally John E.B. Myers er al., 
Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Litigation, 68 Neb. L. Rev. 1.86-92 (1 989); John E.B. 
Myers, The Child Witness: Techniaues for Direct Examination, Cross-Examination and 
Imveachment, 18 Pac. L.J. 801,848 (1987). 
The controversy as to the timing of the admission of expert testimony on battering and 
its effects also stems from early defense attacks on its admissibility in general. Courts faced 
defense claims that expert testimony on battering and its effects was appropriate only when 
offered by adefendant to support a self-defense claim, and not as part of a prosecutor's case-in- 
chief against a batterer. See, e.g., State v. Frost, 577 A.2d at 1286-87. While most courts have 
rejected this position, see note 47 and accompanying text supra, some have retained the 
limitation that the prosecution may only use the expert to rebut or rehabilitate a defense attack. 
See generally Raeder, supra note 6, at 801-02. 
74 See generally Myers, Exoert Testimonv in Child Sexual Abuse Litigation, supra 
note 73, at 90-92. 
7 5 ~ e e ,  .g., State v. Freeney, 637 A.2d 1088 (Conn. 1994); State v. Cababaq, 850 P.2d 
716 (Haw. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Griffin, 564 N.W.2d 370 (Iowa 1997); Commonwealth v. 
Goetzendanner, 679 N.E. 2d 240 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997); Peovle v. Christel, 537 N.W.2d 194 
(Mich. 1995); State v. Searles, 680 A.2d 612 (N.H. 1996); State v. Ellis, 656 A.2d 25 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995); State v. Bednarz, 507 N.W.2d 168 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993). 
76 Experts on child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome widely cite recantation as 
common behavior in abused children. See generally Roland C .  Summit, The Child Sexual 
Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7 Child Abuse & Neglect 177 (1983); Andrew Cohen, Note, 
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expert testimony is admitted to educate the jury that the victim's behavior in 
failing to report the abuse is consistent with the behavior of rape trauma or 
child sexual abuse victims. It is therefore helpful in assessing the victim's 
credibility. Courts have limited the expert testimony to rehabilitation or 
rebuttal because the victim's testimony is consistent with the prosecution's 
case against the defendant. 
In contrast, when battered women recant at trial, their testimony 
supports the defendant. No opportunity to rehabilitate arises; however, this 
should not prevent the admission of expert testimony, since the jury still needs 
to be educated on why the victim may have recanted to properly assess the 
evidence. 
A second guideline for proper prosecutorial use of expert testimony 
is that the expert should not be asked to testify that the witness was in fact 
battered or to give any opinion as to the complainant's truthfulness. To avoid 
undue prejudice to the defendant, the expert should testify only to general 
characteristics of battering and its effects, and not whether the complainant 
exhibits these traits. Prosecutors should also refrain from using hypotheticals 
that mirror too closely the particular facts of the case at bar, because courts 
have deemed this technique as merely a tactic to circumvent the prohibition 
against offering expert testimony on whether the complainant was, in fact, 
battered.77 Judges should specifically instruct the jury on the limitations of the 
expert testimony and that it may not make any inferences from the expert 
testimony about the specific charges at issue.78 
With these directives in place, we can turn to the issue of whether 
expert testimony is appropriate when the complainant refuses to testify. 
The Unreliability of Expert Testimony on the Tvuical Characteristics of Sexual Abuse Victims, 
74 Geo. L.J. 429,443-48 (1985). A sampling of the cases reveals that in many instances where 
recantation is the basis for the admission of expert testimony, the child has testified against the 
defendant at trial, but has previously made inconsistent statements. See, e.g., Wheat v. State, 
527 A.2d 269 (Del. 1987); State v. Batangan, 799 P.2d 48 (Haw. 1990); State v. Middleton, 657 
P.2d 121 5 (Or. 1982). 
See Gershman, supra note 5 0 , s  5-10(f), at 64. 
78 sek e.g., State v. Griffin, 564 N.W.2d 370 (Iowa 1997); State v. Searles, 680 A.2d 
612 (N.H. 1996). 
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PART 111-EXPERT TESTIMONY TO EXPLAIN THE VICTIM'S 
ABSENCE 
As prosecutors litigate more and more domestic violence cases, the 
likelihood increases that they will face situations where complainants refuse 
to testify. This section examines the propriety and parameters of using expert 
testimony to explain the victim's absence.79 
While there exists anecdotal evidence that some courts have allowed 
expert testimony on battering and its effects to explain a complainant's 
ref~sal , '~ only one reported case has addressed the issue. In 1982 in Pruitt v. 
State,8' a Georgia appellate court ruled that such testimony was inadmissible 
for two reasons. First, it ruled that testimony on battered woman's syndrome 
was relevant only to support a defendant's self-defense claim. Second, the 
court held that the prosecution did not establish that the missing witness was 
a battered woman. Pruitt's precedential value is questionable since in the 
years following the decision, a vast majority of courts have made it clear that 
expert testimony on battering should not be limited solely to self-defense 
claims.82 Thus, the issue is essentially one of first impression. 
79 The use of expert testimony to explain the refusal differs from situations where a 
party seeks to introduce a complainant's out-of-court statements by having her declared 
unavailable. See Weinstein & Berger, supra note 27, $804. In this instance, the State may call 
an expert to give testimony on the witness's unavailability. See, e.g., State v. Allen, 755 P.2d 
1153 (Ariz. 1988). Thus, a physician could testify that the witness is unavailable because of a 
medical condition. 
This section addresses the separate issue of whether the expert may testify as to 
characteristics of battered women generally so that the jury may properly assess the evidence 
before it. The court should not allow the expert to testify specifically that the reason the witness 
has refused to testify is because she is a battered woman, since such testimony would be highly 
prejudicial to the defendant. See note 77 and accompanying text supra. 
See Parrish, supra note 6, at 108 n.59. 
296 S.E.2d 795 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982). 
82 See generally Parrish, supra note 4, at 106-08. But see State v. Pargeon, 582 
N.E.2d 665 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991). Since m, Georgia courts have strongly endorsed the use 
of expert testimony to support self-defense claims, even in non-traditional situations, such as 
sleeping spouse cases. See Cha~man v. State, 386 S.E.2d 129 (Ga. 1989). Concomitantly, the 
Georgia legislature has specified that defendants may introduce expert testimony to support a 
justification defense. Ga. Code Ann. 16-3-21(d) (Michie 1994). Finally, Georgia courts have 
allowed expert testimony to explain that sexual assault victim's behavior was consistent with 
the battered woman's syndrome. See Thomvson v. State, 416 S.E.2d 755 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). 
Given this trend, w s  continued validity is questionable. 
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The first consideration for the admission of expert testimony in 
domestic violence cases is whether such testimony is relevant. Expert 
testimony is relevant if it is material and probative to the issues in dispute and 
if it "assist[s] the trier of fact to understand the evidence."83 Implicit in this 
requirement is that the prosecutor establish a prima facie case against the 
defendant. If the only evidence that the prosecutor has is the victim's 
testimony and the victim refuses to testify, the State is left without evidence, 
and the court should grant a defense motion for dismissal. 
To ensure the prosecution of domestic violence cases without the 
victim's cooperation, battered women's advocates have long urged that law 
enforcement officers and prosecutors be trained in so-called "victimless" 
prosecutions to shift the paradigm of prosecuting domestic violence cases 
away from being victim-driven.84 Practitioners and commentators have 
suggested a number of steps that police officers and prosecutors can take to 
prosecute a domestic violence case without the victim's cooperation. Most of 
these guidelines are equally applicable to prosecuting a case without the 
victim's presence at trial. These steps include pragmatic recommendations for 
law enforcement in the gathering of physical evidence, including the recording 
of statements the victim makes at the scene; obtaining emergency 91 1 tapes 
and medical records of treatment the victim obtained following a violent 
incident." Concomitantly, prosecutors have been successful in developing 
trial strategies that have gradually gained judicial a~ceptance.'~ They include 
The Pruitt court's finding that the prosecutors did not establish a sufficient factual 
foundation for the admission of expert testimony should be limited to the facts of the case. 
83 Fed. R. Evid. 702. See notes 26-28 and accompanying text supra. 
84 See Mary E. Asmus et al., Prosecuting Domestic Abuse Cases in Duluth: 
Developing Effective Prosecution Strategies From Understanding the Dvnamics of Abusive 
Relationships, 15 Harnline L. Rev. 115 (1991); Developments in the Law-Legal Resvonses 
to Domestic Violence, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1498 (1993); Casey G. Gwinn & Anne O'Dell, 
Stopping the Violence: The Role of the Police Officer and the Prosecutor, 20 W. St. U. L. Rev. 
297 (1993). 
"See Hanna, supra note 1, at 1901-03; Casey & ODell ,  supra note 84. One small 
town purchased eleven Polaroid cameras for its police force to allow immediate close-up 
photographs of a victim's injuries. See John Pope, Petersburg Arrests Mandatow in Cases of 
Domestic Violence, Richmond Times Dispatch, May 1, 1997, at B8. 
86 See generally Keith, supra note 20. See also Hanna, supra note 1, at 1905-06; 
Waits, supra note 10, at 327-28 (noting the prosecutor's role in educating judges to alter 
antiquated notions of domestic violence). 
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introducing out-of-court statements under excited utterance, unavailability, or 
admission hearsay  exception^.^' Commentators have suggested other methods 
of obtaining evidence against the defendant, including using propensity 
evidence8' and hearsay exceptions that to date have only applied to children.89 
It is against this backdrop that we can examine the propriety of 
allowing a prosecutor to offer expert testimony as part of a victimless 
prosecution. Since courts consistently have allowed expert testimony to rebut 
a defense attack on a witness's behavior, the easiest scenario for the 
introduction of expert testimony is where the defense uses the complainant's 
absence to attack the prosecution's case. If the defense requests a missing 
witness chargeg0 or if it attacks the prosecution's case based on the victim's 
absence, the court should allow the expert testimony to rebut the defense 
attack. Additionally, if the defendant suggests that he was not in a battering 
relationship, expert testimony on its dynamics would be relevant to explain the 
complainant's absence. 
87 See Asmus, supra note 84, at 19-144; Hanna, supra note 1, at 1903-04. Other 
hearsay exceptions may require the presence of the declarant at trial, thus precluding their 
applicability when the complainant refuses to testify. See, e.g., Asmus, supra note 84, at 139 
(discussing the present sense impression exception). 
"See Hanna, supra note 1, at 1905. 
89 Several states have created so-called "prompt complaint" hearsay exceptions for 
statements made by sexual assault and child abuse victims. See, e.g., Tex. Crim. P. Code Ann. 
5 38.072 (1998). See generally Domestic Violence, 15 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 871, 887-88 
(1989). The impetus for creating special hearsay exception in sex and child abuse cases was the 
unique nature of these types of cases, in that the victims are often reluctant or unwilling to 
testify, third party witnesses to the assault are rare, and the physical evidence may be 
inconclusive. Courts and commentators have noted the similarities between rape trauma 
syndrome and child abuse syndrome cases and domestic violence cases. See note 76 and 
accompanying text supra. Accordingly, the "prompt complaint" exception may very well apply 
to domestic violence cases. See Domestic Violence, supra, at 887-88. 
90 A "missing witness" charge allows a jury to draw an adverse inference from a 
party's failure to call a witness when the testimony would be material and the witness is within 
the control of that party. See United States v. Torres, 845 F.2d 1 165,1169 (2d Cir. 1988). See 
generally 1 Moore's Federal Practice 5 630.30[5] (3d ed. 1997). Whether a complainant in a 
domestic violence case is under the State's control is questionable. See generally Pace 
University School of Law Battered Women's Justice Center, Memorandum of Law, In Domestic 
Violence Cases Where the Victim Refuses to Testifv for the Prosecution. Can the Defendant 
Obtain a Missing Witness Charge? (last modified June 10, 1998) 
<http://www.law.pace.edulbwjclmisswit.htm. 
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At least one court has permitted the State to offer expert testimony on 
battered woman's syndrome in a homicide case where the defendant pointed 
to the victim's continued relationship with him to attack the prosecutor's 
charge that he intentionally murdered her. In Isaacs v. State,g' the trial court 
permitted the expert testimony to "refute, rebut, or at least to explain why a 
woman who has been allegedly battered would continue to go back to, and 
have an affair with the individual who was doing the battering."92 In affirming 
the defendant's conviction, the Supreme Court of Indiana reasoned that the 
expert testimony was properly admitted to refute the notion that the defendant 
and the victim had a good relationship prior to her death. 
While Isaacs is a homicide case where the victim is obviously 
unavailable, its import is applicable to domestic violence prosecutions when 
the complainant refuses to testify. Where a domestic violence defendant 
denies the charges against him, and instead attempts to portray a good 
relationship between himself and the missing complainant, the court should 
permit the prosecutor to offer expert testimony on battering and its effects to 
explain a missing witness's seemingly inconsistent behavior toward the 
defendant, such as remaining with him despite claims of abuse. 
Even without a direct defense attack on the complainant's absence, the 
prosecution should still be able to introduce expert testimony if there is 
sufficient independent evidence to support the charges against the defendant. 
As the previous sections demonstrated, courts have ruled that it is a witness's 
puzzling or incongruous behavior which the average juror may not understand, 
creating the need for expert testimony. To a juror unschooled in the dynamics 
of domestic violence, the refusal of a complainant to testify against the 
defendant is the quintessence of puzzling behavior. The jury might easily 
interpret the refusal to appear as evidence that the complainant was not 
injured, thus undermining the independent evidence offered by the 
prosecution. Expert testimony would therefore be helpful to neutralize any 
negative implications the jury may draw from the complainant's refusal to 
testify. 
The refusal to testify in such a situation is analogous to a 
complainant's recantation at trial of earlier statements implicating the 
defendant. Thus, the same rules that govern the admissibility of expert 
testimony to explain a recantation should govern in this situation.93 The 
91 659 N.E.2d 1036 (Ind. 1995). 
'' Id. at 1 0 4 1  
93 See note 47 and accompanying text supra. 
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prosecution would not be using the expert to impermissibly bolster its case, 
but rather to explain general characteristics of the dynamics of domestic 
violence to the jurors who may naturally be confused by the complainant's 
absence, and who may thus improperly draw negative conclusions from her 
absence. 
Defendants will object to the prosecutorial use of expert testimony 
when a witness refuses to testify by claiming that the expert testimony is too 
speculative or without proper foundation. To forestall such an objection, in 
addition to the independent evidence of the charges and a foundation that the 
victim was a battered woman:4 the prosecution should be prepared to offer 
testimony that explains its office's efforts to get the complainant to testify and 
to explain that she is aware that the trial is taking place." In addition, 
prosecutors should be prepared to stress that the expert testimony is not 
offered as positive evidence of the charges against the defendant, but only as 
a means of negating the negative inferences the jury might derive from the 
complainant's absence. 
As in the case of a recantation, the courts must carefully delineate the 
proper scope of the expert testimony to avoid undue prejudice to the 
defendant. The expert should not be permitted to opine as to the reason for 
the particular complainant's absence. The expert should also be prohibited 
from testifying as to whether the complainant was in fact a battered woman. 
The expert should only be allowed to describe common characteristics of 
battering and its effects on women, including why a person may refuse to 
testify. 
CONCLUSION 
Much progress has been made in the past two decades to educate the 
general public about the breadth and depth of domestic violence in this 
country. Law enforcement has begun to take an aggressive stance against 
See, e.g., Camahan v. State, 681 N.E.2d 1 164 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). 
95 Additionally, the defense may claim that Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause 
rights are violated by the complainant's absence. U.S. Const. amend VI. The court should 
reject this contention because the prosecution is proceeding with independent evidence of the 
charges, including hearsay statements that do not required the complainant's presence at trial. 
See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990). See generally Jacqueline Miller Beckett, The True 
Value of the Confrontation Clause: A Studv of Child Sex Abuse Trials, 82 Geo. L.J. 1605 
(1994); Diana Younts, Note, Evaluating and Admitting Ex~ert  Opinion Testimony in Child 
Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 1991 Duke L.J. 691 (1991). 
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domestic violence through mandatory arrest and no-drop policies. However, 
unless jurors fully comprehend the enormous emotional, physical, financial, 
and sociological effects of battering, they will be unable to adequately assess 
the cases before them. 
The propriety of expert testimony on battering and its effects in 
support of self-defense claims has become a settled principle of law because 
the courts have recognized that jurors may be clouded by misconceptions 
about domestic violence. The admissibility of expert testimony is grounded 
on its ability to assist the finders of fact. The same rationale that has led to 
judicial acceptance of defensive use of expert testimony applies to 
prosecutorial use of expert testimony. The expert can provide the jurors with 
an understanding of why a victim of domestic violence would remain in an 
abusive relationship, why she may recant charges against her abuser, or why 
she may refuse to appear at trial. The courts have reacted favorably to 
prosecutorial use of expert testimony, particularly when it is used to 
rehabilitate a witness. Accordingly, prosecutors should include expert 
testimony as an integral part of their trial strategy. In so doing, prosecutors 
will be able to lessen the undue reliance they have placed historically on a 
victim's testimony. Developing independent evidence to support the charges 
against a defendant, together with expert testimony to explain the effects of 
battering and demystify a victim's puzzling behavior, will help prosecutors in 
vigorously prosecuting domestic violence incidents. 
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